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- 2 -

3. There is such complete identity of views between Communist Moscow and Communist Belgrade on international affairs and foreign policy as to make their closest cooperation, whether covert or overt, inevitable. All talk of neutrality or coexistence is unrealistic and out of the question. This would not fit in with Tito's character nor with the desires of a leading Communist who spent years in prison in the hope of being in the vanguard of the world revolution. It is to be expected that within six months of the Khrushchev visit that Tito will visit Moscow. Tito would like to increase his prestige both in Moscow and in Washington, but in all things he will be working in alliance with Moscow as a faithful Communist for the eventual destruction of capitalism.
4. Close relations between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist Parties are not to be expected before two or three years have elapsed. The 5000 pro-Cominformist Yugoslavs released from Yugoslav prisons must hold limitless hatred for Tito and Rankovic, and permitting Moscow to have access to them would enable the latter to put pressure on Tito if able leaders were to appear among the pro-Cominformists. As matters stand, close governmental relations are safer, since the Titoists hold the key government positions.
5. Ideological factors place the Yugoslav Government heart and mind with Moscow. However, Yugoslavia's geographic position, cultural inheritance, Partisan war experience and the psychological conditioning resulting from the 1948 break will result in Yugoslavia's insisting on greater independence of Moscow than will ever be enjoyed by the Satellites.

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